How can the law in England and Wales be reformed in order to regulate offensive online communications with respect to the right of freedom of expression? by Chambers, Estelle et al.

Volume 1 Issue 1 Student Journal of Professional Practice and Academic Research 
100 
Northumbria University – ISSN 2632-0452 – All content CC-BY 4.0 
 
  
2018 
How can the law in 
England and Wales be 
reformed in order to 
regulate offensive 
online communications 
with respect to the right 
of freedom of 
expression? 
WORD COUNT: 2496 
ESTELLE CHAMBERS, LAURA CARR, CHARLOTTE BUSHBY, REBECCA 
EVERSON, SARAH CURRAN, JASKARAN CHATHA 
Volume 1 Issue 1 Student Journal of Professional Practice and Academic Research 
101 
Northumbria University – ISSN 2632-0452 – All content CC-BY 4.0 
Introduction 
The evolution of social media in recent years has significantly changed the way society 
interacts and engages with each other. Research has shown that there has been a 21% increase 
in social media usage by UK adults from 2011 to 20171. This drastic shift regarding the way 
we communicate can be said to bring many benefits; however, it can also impose serious legal 
issues. Such legal issues include ‘revenge porn’, online blackmail and ‘trolling’. For the 
purpose of this investigation, the main focus of the research will be on the area of offensive 
online communications. 
The investigation will cover the effectiveness of the current criminal law in terms of offensive 
online communications. In addition to this, the research will be highlighting any gaps within 
the current law in regard to overcoming this problem. When considering potential reforms, the 
right to freedom of expression will remain at the forefront of the research to prevent any 
alienation of human rights. 
 
How is the existing language in the Communications Act 2003 and the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 in need of reform? 
Many legal writers and official bodies such as the Law Commission and the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) have acknowledged the problems the archaic nature of the Malicious 
Communications Act 19882 and the Communications Act 20033 create in criminalising 
offensive online communications. This concern has heightened recently as more people access 
social media4. Despite this, there has been no statutory reform and instead judges and the CPS 
are left to interpret the ambiguous and outdated terms in the Acts. This suggests the law is 
‘fragmented’5, due to the ‘scattergun’ approach used by parliament when creating the law. 
Academics across the field agree that this is a highly relevant issue as an increasing number of 
                                                     
1 Office for national statistics, 'Social Networking by age group, 2011 to 2017' (Office for National Statistics, 24 
August 2017) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsocialmedi
ausage/adhocs/007401socialnetworkingbyagegroup2011to2017> accessed 6 November 2018 
2 Malicious Communications Act 1998, s.1 
3 Communications Act 2003, s.127 
4 n.1 Refer back to the statistics stated in the introduction 
5 Chara Bakalis, “Rethinking cyberhate laws” (2017) 27(1)  Information & Communications Technology Law 86-
110 
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defendants are self-represented and inappropriate technical and obsolete language only further 
alienates the public from our system, which damages the profession.6 
In their 2013 guidelines on ‘Prosecuting cases involving communications sent via 
social media’7, the CPS stress the need to interpret the meaning of terms such as ‘grossly 
offensive’ in compliance with the right to freedom of expression. It was decided in Connolly v 
DPP8 that ‘grossly’ should be given its ‘ordinary’9meaning, as well as words included in the 
2003 act such as ‘indecent’ and ‘obscene’. Although the courts declared this, there remains an 
element of ambiguity in what the ‘ordinary’ meaning is. Considering the context of the acts, 
with the 1988 Act created for postal communications and the 2003 Act for broadcasts, it is 
questionable whether the ordinary meaning of grossly offensive remains the same in relation 
to the internet and social media or whether the standard differs.  Furthermore, this lack of clarity 
means it can never be clear when a comment said online crosses the line from being ‘merely 
offensive’10 to something that is ‘so grossly offensive it should be criminalised’11 meaning 
there is a lack of certainty in the law. 
 Although the CPS have attempted to improve this understanding it remains 
questionable whether it is effective in practice, with many academic writers including Laura 
Bliss, as well as the Law Commission, criticising the current law. This is shown through the 
different outcomes of cases such as the unreported case of R v Woods in 201212 when the 
defendant made comments online about missing April Jones, and the homophobic comments 
made by the defendant in Thomas13. Thomas was not convicted which emphasises the lack of 
clarity as to ‘what amounts to a grossly offensive comment’14. 
 It seems apparent that reform of the law on offensive communications is necessary to 
be effective in modern society, with many arguing that ‘guidelines are no substitute for clearer 
                                                     
6 Alexandra-Maria Eugenicos, 'Should we reform the Offences Against the Person Act 1861?' (2017) 81(1) 
Journal of Criminal Law 
7 Crown Prosecution Service, “Social Media – Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent 
via social media” (revised 21 August 2018) 
8 Connolly v DPP (2007) EWHC 237; (2008) 1 W.L.R. 276 
9 Ibid [3] 
10 Laura Bliss, “The crown Prosecution guidelines and grossly offensive comments: an analysis” (2017) 9(2) 
Journal of Media Law 173-188 
11 ibid 
12 R v Woods case stated in n.10 
13 R v Thomas case stated in n.10 
14 n.10 
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law’15. The Law Commission has for years encouraged the codification of the criminal law16, 
describing it as ‘vague and unclear’17. 
Are the mens rea elements clear in the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and the 
Communications Act 2003? 
For a defendant to be prosecuted of an offensive online communication, the mens rea element 
of intention must be proven. In criminal cases, the concept of intention can be described in two 
distinct ways through the clarification in cases. Firstly, as oblique intent; this is where the 
consequence of the defendant’s action is “virtually certain” 18. Secondly as direct intent, 
meaning the defendant wants to complete a desired aim or purpose19.  
In addition to this, offences can be described as either a basic intent crime or a specific 
intent crime. Like these previous concepts of intention, these terms have been defined using 
common law. The main difference between the two is crimes which only have the mens rea as 
intention is of specific intent, whereas the mens rea could be recklessness, which is “D taking 
an unjustifiable risk of a particular consequence occurring”20 or intention for basic intent 
crimes.21  
The issue surrounding the mens rea elements in the Malicious Communications Act 
198822 and the Communications Act 200323 is that the meaning is unclear. In the Malicious 
Communications Act, it is stated that the defendant must have the intention to “cause distress 
or anxiety” 24 when sending an online communication. This idea is confirmed in Chambers25, 
in which the defendant must have “acted with a specific purpose in mind”26. Therefore, it must 
be proven that the defendant is trying to send the communication with the thought of the 
recipient being disturbed by the message. Even if the person does not feel this way, the 
                                                     
15 Kat Shields and Katie Jones, “Tackling online trolling” (2016) 180(37) Criminal Law & Justice Weekly  
16 Mary Arden, 'Criminal law at the crossroads: the impact of human rights from the Law Commission's 
perspective and the need for a code' (1999] 1(1) Criminal Law Review 
17 Law Commission, “Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report” (Law Com No 381, 
2018) 113, para 5.95 
18 R v Nedrick [1986] 3 All ER 47 - Case was used to provide a test for a distinction between direct intent and 
oblique intent 
19 Tony Storey, Unlocking Criminal Law (6 edn, Routledge 2017) 62 
20 Ibid 67 
21 Ibid 296 
22 n.2 
23 n.3 
24 n.2 [s.1(1b)] 
25 DDP v Chambers [2012] EWHC 2157 
26 ibid [36] 
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defendant could still be charged, as “the sender of the grossly offensive message must intend 
it to cause distress or anxiety to its immediate or eventual recipient”27, thus making it not a 
‘constitutional element’28 of the crime. However in the relevant section of the Communications 
Act29, it does not mention intention at all. Therefore, in Collins30, it needed to be clarified that 
intent was a necessary mens rea element. 
Despite both acts needing intention to be a necessary mens rea element, the intention 
is different in each act. Chambers mentions the Malicious Communications Act is “a specific 
intent [crime, whilst] no express provision is made in [the Communications Act] section 
127(1)(a) for mens rea. It is therefore an offence of basic intent.”31 This suggests that 
recklessness can be a contributing factor, to be charged under the communications act, which 
is not stated in the statute like ‘intention’ is. By clearly stating this, it can help distinguish what 
offences can be charged under which act as there is much confusion due to the overlap of the 
two. Additionally, as there is some distinction between the two intents through the common 
law, it can be argued that the Malicious Communication Act requires direct intent because the 
‘intention’ is necessary for a crime to occur. Furthermore, oblique intent is the element in the 
Communications Act as recklessness can be in the mens rea.   
Academic Chara Bakalis discusses the consequences of the mens rea elements of both 
acts in detail. When discussing the mens rea for the Malicious Communications Act, Bakalis 
highlights that the actus reus is broad, and for the act to be concise, the mens rea needs to be 
able to narrow this down. Nevertheless, due to the mens rea being intention, it does not 
correctly limit the offence, as a defendant can just state that they did not mean to create “distress 
or anxiety”. Therefore, the Malicious Communications Act is not fulfilling its aim, when it 
comes to regulating online communications. Furthermore, Bakalis discusses the importance of 
the mens rea element in the Communications Act, by using an example of an “online but private 
conversation of two racists on holocaust denial as the discussion could plausibly be 
characterised as ‘grossly offensive’”32. As the conversation was private and the comments were 
not used to create disgust amongst a wider audience, this would not be a crime as the mens rea 
                                                     
27 Collins v DDP [2006] 1 WLR 2223 (UKHL) [26] 
28 Q Hunt, 'Striking a balance - Malicious Communication Act and free speech' (Criminal Defence Barrister Blog, 
28 May) <http://www.bestcriminaldefencebarrister.co.uk/criminal-defence-barrister-blog/2018/striking-a-
balance-malicious-communication-act-and-free-speech.aspx> accessed 14 November 2018  
29 n.2 
30 n.27 
31 n.25 [36] 
32 n.5 
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would not be present.33 This illustrates the need for a clearer definition of the mens rea element 
within the legislation, which could withstand evolution of social media. 
Finally, the need to prove intention could become difficult in the essence of online 
communication cases, involving children and young adults. It is already hard to prove intention, 
but it becomes more difficult if a serious crime occurs and the person prosecuted is not fully 
capable of understanding words that “cause distress or anxiety”34. Many young people use 
offensive language online towards other individuals, due to the accessibility of social media35. 
One case which highlights this, which occurred in America, was Logan v Sycamore Community 
School36. From this case it can be determined that it is difficult to judge whether the defendants 
intended to say those words in an offensive manner, as they were young adults. The case was 
settled and led to the “Jessica Logan Act”, being implemented into Ohio state law37. This law 
revises the laws within schools regarding harassment through an electronic act. In areas of the 
world which online offensive communications are also a major issue, legislation is being 
introduced to adjust with the advances to prevent situations like the example from occurring. 
This, however, is not occurring in England and Wales and shows that reforms regarding the 
mens rea, are urgent, primarily due to the last update being in 2003. 
 
Will reforming the law restrict freedom of expression? 
Although many academic writers state that current legislation needs to be reformed, a possible 
reason why this has not occurred is the fear of breaching the freedom of expresson. The 
freedom of expression proposed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights38 
is protected by common law and is arguably one of the most important fundamental freedoms 
that stabilises democratic society.  This includes the ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers’39.  
                                                     
33 ibid 
34 n.2 
35 D Watkins, 'Where do I stand? Assessing children's capabilities under English law' (2016) 28(1) Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 25-44  
36 Logan v. Sycamore Community School Bd. Of Educ., 780 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Ohio 2011) - facts of this case 
can be found in the judgement 
37 Substitute House Bill Number 116, 129th General Assembly, (Ohio 2012) 
38 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 10 
39 Human Rights Act 1998 Article 10 s 1 
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Although the act exercises that this right is universal, meaning it applies to everyone, 
there are however restrictions which are executed by the law. These restrictions ‘are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime. 40 When trying to justify the freedom of expression, 
numerous factors are to be considered. For example, these may include ‘the identity of the 
speaker, the context of the speech and its purpose, as well as the actual words spoken or 
written’.41 
Regarding the Malicious Communications Act a person will therefore be found guilty 
if they send ‘any letter, email, photograph or recording which is indecent, grossly offensive or 
which conveys a threat is an offence if the sender intends to cause distress or anxiety to the 
recipient’42.  Once convicted under this act it could be said that an individual’s right to the 
freedom to expression was breached. However, it is important to note that Article 10 of the 
Human Rights Act is a ‘qualified right’ meaning that it is used in proportion within society to 
achieve its telos. 
 The same principle applies under the Communications Act 2003. The case of R v 
Chabloz43 can be used to illustrate how the freedom of expression can somewhat be limited 
when meeting the demands of the law. The Defendant in this case made several anti-Semitic 
comments online. Prosecuted under s.127, Chabloz attempted to use Article 10 as her defence 
which ‘illustrate(s) the continued difficulties the criminal justice system experiences’44 in 
understanding when the law should limit an individual’s freedom of expression.  Article 10 is 
not an absolute right and can be restricted if certain criteria are met but it remains unclear as to 
when the law should intervene. 
A specific case, similar to Chabloz, is Collins, as mentioned prior. This case involved 
a man who made several phone calls to Westminster offices. ‘In these telephone calls and 
recorded messages the respondent, who held strong views on immigration and asylum policy 
and the provision of public support to immigrants and applicants for asylum, ranted and 
shouted and made reference to "Wogs", "Pakis", "Black bastards" and (according to the 
                                                     
40 ibid ss.2 
41 'Freedom of expression Legal Framework' (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 25th May 2016) 
<https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/20150318_foe_legal_framework_guidance_revised_fi
nal.pdf> accessed 14 November 2018 
42 n.2 
43R v Chabloz case cited in article “Social Media; ‘A theme park just for fools’ – R v Alison Chabloz” (n.44) 
44 Laura Bliss, “Social Media; ‘A theme park just for fools’ – R v Alison Chabloz” (2018) J. Crim. L. 82(4), 301-
304 
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statement of facts agreed between the parties for purposes of this appeal but not the case stated 
by the Justices) "Niggers"45. When prosecuted, he tried to use Article 10 to his defence, but 
was unsuccessful because the need to protect public safety overruled the qualified right to 
freedom of expression. 
If the Malicious Communications Act and the Communications Act are to be reformed, 
there needs to be clarity in what is deemed freedom of expression and offensive language. 
Academics such as Chara Bakalis reiterates this as she states “the underlying purpose of each 
piece of legislation will need to be articulated and subsequently examined to determine whether 
the mischief it is protecting does indeed fall into the Article 10(2) exceptions.”46 As freedom 
of expression is such a fundamental right, it should always be considered in order to stabilise 
a democratic society. 
 
Conclusion 
After careful consideration and extensive research on this topic, it is clear that reforms are 
necessary in order to codify and consolidate the law. As a result, this will help regulate 
offensive online communications.  
 A way that could be suggested to consolidate the law would be to combine the relevant 
areas of the two existing Acts to create a single piece of legislation. This would make the law 
regarding offensive online communications more accessible. Therefore, removing the 
‘scattergun’ approach used by parliament when creating the current law, making it easier to 
prosecute in future. However, this single piece of legislation could prove to be too narrow as it 
has the potential to brush over significant parts of the two existing Acts. To prevent this, a 
significant amount of time should be allocated reviewing the proposed reform. 
 As well as consolidating the law, codification of the law is also necessary. This would 
relate to the use of archaic vocabulary in the current legislation, such as ‘grossly offensive’ and 
‘obscene’. The use of these words is outdated in modern society. To update the law, more 
articulated vocabulary should replace the archaic phrasing used previously, with definitions 
included in the reformed Act.  
                                                     
45 n.27 [40] 
46 n.5 
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 Another important element to consider is the transparency of the mens rea in the 
reformed legislation. For the two separate offences, intention and/or recklessness should be 
clearly specified. The new law should try to identify what actions, or lack of them, would 
determine the culpability of the crime.  
 The freedom of expression should not be ignored when reforming this law, as it is vital 
to human rights. A clear distinction should be made in order to clarify when an expression 
becomes a criminal offence. The inclusion of this right in the reformed law should highlight 
key aspects of the human rights act, making it clear when offensive online communications is 
no longer an opinion, but a criminal act.   
With the suggested reforms taken into consideration, it is likely that it will become 
easier to regulate offensive online communications with respect to the freedom of expression. 
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